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ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies the impact of changes in outside marriage market
opportunities on intra-household bargaining power. In the first chapter, I analyze the impact
of the availability of healthy mates on intra-household bargaining power. I specify a marriage
market matching model and test the main prediction that in marriage markets in which both
healthy and frail men marry, an increase in the relative scarcity of healthy women enhances
wives' bargaining power. This effect is estimated in a collective labor supply framework in
which spousal bargaining power and labor supply are inversely related. I use CPS data and
Census data on disability and construct a sex ratio by health status at the metropolitan level.
I estimate labor supplies for white married couples and find that a higher relative scarcity of
healthy women in the couple's metropolitan area reduces wives' labor supply and increases
their husbands'. The role of sex ratios on spouses' bargaining power is further explored in
the second chapter. Using Census and CPS data for U.S. metropolitan areas in years 2000,
1990 and 1980, we construct a quality sex ratio by education brackets. We argue that a
relative shortage of suitably educated women in the spouse's potential marriage market
increases wives' bargaining power and it lowers their husbands'. We further check the
prediction that this effect is greater as the assortative rank of couples by education increases.
We find that higher relative shortage of comparably educated women in the couple's
metropolitan area reduces wives' labor supply and increases their husbands'. The impact is
stronger for couples in higher education groups. Consistent with bargaining theory, no such
effects are found for unmarried individuals.
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CHAPTER ONE
IN SICKNESS AND IN HEALTH: THE EFFECTS OF MATE
AVAILABILITY ON INTRA-HOUSEHOLD
BARGAINING POWER

1. Introduction
In the U.S., women live longer and survive in higher numbers at any age than men.
This gender differential persists and varies over time (Verbrugge 1985, Kinsella and Gist
1998). As both life expectancy and survival rates are considered fundamental health
indicators (Cutler and Richardson 1997), it follows that more women are healthy across time
and age than men.1
The relationship between own health and labor market performance is well
documented in the literature. Empirical studies show that own poor health is associated with
decreased earnings and participation in the labor market (Baldwin et al. 1994, Costa 1996,
Kahn 1998). Furthermore, Parsons (1977) and Berger and Fleisher (1984) show that own
poor health also affects spousal labor supply while Schulz et al. (1995) find that caring for an
unhealthy spouse may have direct negative effects on the own health of the caregiver.
Therefore, good health is valuable in the labor market as well as in the marriage market.
This paper examines the marriage market effects of the availability of healthy mates
on intra-household bargaining power. Intra-marital allocations are affected by changes in

For a detailed discussion of measures and trends in healthy life expectancy across gender, the reader is
referred to Verbrugge (1997) and Crimmins, Hayward and Saito (1996).
1

1

marriage market outside opportunities, such as divorce laws and sex ratios (Chiappori et al.
2002, Chiappori et al. 2005).
I construct a simple matching marriage model to formally assess whether healthy and
frail individuals marry and how spouses allocate their resources. There are companionship
benefits generated by marriage, but marriage to a frail spouse entails a cost. For simplicity,
women are assumed to be all healthy, while men vary according to their health status—
healthy, frail and very frail. The property of the equilibrium depends on the relative number
of women and men in the marriage market, i.e. whether frail men marry also. Several
predictions are generated by this simple model. Healthy women are better off in marriage
markets where they are fewer in number than healthy men compared to marriage markets
where there are not enough healthy men and some women marry frail men. Moreover,
depending on how seriously frail the last married man is, healthy women gain less and less
from marriage.
I use CPS and Census data for the year 2000 to test for the impact of healthy mate
availability on intra-household bargaining power. I focus on white married couples and use
single individuals as a control group. I construct sex ratios by health status to measure mate
availability and consider local marriage markets at the metropolitan level. According to the
model, if some frail men marry, an increase in the health ratio (less healthy women relative to
healthy men) favors wives. Also, according to models of collective household behavior,
increased female intra-household bargaining power generates a reduction in wives’ labor
supply and an increase in husbands’ labor supply.
I find empirical support for the above prediction. Specifically, wives decrease their
labor supply significantly as a response to an increase in the health ratio, while husbands
increase theirs. Additionally, the effect is stronger for couples where the spousal age gap is

2

larger. As expected, the health ratio has no effect on the labor supplies of unmarried
individuals of either gender.

2. Related Literature
Three strands of literature are related to this study. The first strand includes studies
that focus on the relationship between outside marriage market opportunities and intramarital allocations (Chiappori et al. 2002, Chiappori et al. 2005). These studies extend the
collective household model to allow and test for the effects of variations in outside marriage
market opportunities, such as mate availability, on intra-household bargaining power. A
relevant result that emerges from this strand is that changes favoring one spouse increase his
or her bargaining power in the household and the share of resources he or she controls. This
income effect is measured as a reduction in the labor supply of the favored spouse and an
increase for the other. Chiappori et al. (2002) use 1990 Census data by state and PSID data
on working couples and find that higher sex ratios reduce wives’ labor supply and increase
the husbands’.
A second strand of literature analyzes the gains to marriage from health and spousal
sorting by health status. Grossman (1972) first modeled health as an input in both home and
market production. Since then, empirical studies have repeatedly shown that poor health is
associated with decreased earnings and lower labor force participation (Baldwin et al. 1994,
Costa 1996, Kahn 1998). Furthermore, the poor health of a spouse may have direct negative
effects on the own health of the other spouse, i.e. the caregiver (Schulz et al. 1995, Schulz et
al. 1999). Wilson (2002) finds a positive inter-spousal correlation in health status among
older married couples for the U.S. in 1992. Finally, using Swedish data, Nakosteen et al.
(2005) document nonrandom matching into marriage on the basis of disability status.

3

The theoretical section of this study is fundamentally related to a strand of literature
developing models in which the intra-household allocation of resources is the outcome of a
matching equilibrium. Earlier work by Neal (2004) models marriage and fertility choices as
completely determined by the economic surplus in different family structures. The economic
surplus differs across matches due to individuals’ endowments heterogeneity. Recently,
Chiappori and Oreffice (2007) emphasize differences in tastes for children in their analysis
of marriage and fertility choices. The properties of the stable match depend on the
respective number of available mates in the marriage market. My approach differs from
these studies in that I focus rather on the marriage decision and do not consider fertility
choices. Moreover, the heterogeneity of health status as the decisive factor in determining
match-specific marital surplus.
None of these studies, however, models the impact of the availability of healthy
mates in the marriage market on intra-household bargaining power or estimates the
magnitude of such an effect on the labor supply decisions of the spouses.

3. The Basic Model
In this section I develop a simple marriage market matching model. Marriage is the
outcome of a frictionless process, and in equilibrium (or stable assignment), there is no
married person who would rather be single, and there are no two persons, married or
unmarried, who would prefer to form a new union. Utility is transferable, so couples in
equilibrium maximize total surplus. Assume a world of identical, healthy women (W) and
heterogeneous men: healthy men (HM), frail men (FM) and very frail men (VFM).
Single, healthy men earn income Y. There is a cost to being frail, C, so that single
frail men earn Y-C. Unmarried women enjoy income Z. The parameter

4

denotes a

“companionship” benefit realized by each spouse upon marriage while

represents the

fraction of the cost C, borne by the wife of a frail man. Additionally, X is the extra cost
borne by the caregiver, and it is increasing with the seriousness of the condition of the
husband. For instance, this could be the negative care-giving effect on the spouse’s own
health.
The cost X, defined on a continuous support, is zero for healthy men, takes values in
the interval (0, X ) for frail men and is greater than X for very frail men. The threshold X is
the value of X for which the marriage surplus is zero, i.e. X = 2 .
If a woman marries a healthy man, the payoffs of the two spouses become,
respectively:
PW= Z +

(1)

PHM= Y +

(2)

The total outcome of the marriage is Z + Y + 2 , corresponding to a marriage surplus of
2 . If the woman marries a frail man, the marriage surplus is 2

X and decreasing in X,

where X (0, X ) :
PW= Z +

C

X

(3)

PFM= Y +

(1

)C

(4)

C+2

X

(5)

Total: Z + Y

5

The payoffs resulting from a marriage to a very frail man are the same as above, with
X above the threshold X . This means that the marriage surplus is negative. Thus, women
never marry very frail men because upon marriage, they would consume less than their single
income Z.

3.1. Possible scenarios in the marriage market
The division of the marital surplus between the two spouses depends on the relative
scarcity of each spouse in the marriage market. We can thus distinguish the following distinct
marriage market scenarios.
First consider the case of an excess supply of men. Since women are scarcer than
men, the latter have to compete for a wife on the marriage market. This means that
whichever men generate a larger surplus for their wives marry first. Thus, if it is the case that
a frail man is married it must be that all healthy men are already married. Healthy men
generate a higher total marriage surplus and thus are strictly preferred by women in the
marriage market. The division of the marital surplus between spouses depends on the
identity of the marginal spouse, i.e. the last man to marry. Depending on whether the last
married man is healthy or frail, I distinguish the following cases.

Excess supply of healthy men (ESHM)
This case includes marriage markets in which the number of women is smaller than
the number of healthy men. As illustrated in Figure 1, the last man to marry is healthy. All
women marry, and since healthy men are in excess, they will compete for the women and bid
away their own gains from marriage. The last man to get married will be indifferent between
getting married and being single and will accept a payoff of Y, leaving the entire marital

6

surplus to the wife. Women are identical and so stability requires that each woman gains the
same payoff upon marriage. Frail men remain single and enjoy Y-C.

Z+2
Z+2

X

Xm

X

Figure 1. Maximum wife’s payoff as a function of X if healthy men are in excess
supply (ESHM).

Excess supply of frail men (ESFM)
In this case women are more numerous than healthy men but less numerous than
healthy and frail men together. Under these circumstances, all women marry and they marry
both healthy and frail men. Figure 2 provides a graphical description of this scenario.

7

Z+2
Z+2

X

Xm X

Figure 2. Maximum wife’s payoff as a function of X if frail men are in excess supply
(ESFM).

The last man to marry is frail; the X that corresponds to the marginal man to marry
will be referred to as Xm. Frail men compete for a spouse and bid away their gains from
marriage and the marginal man remains with his “single” payoff. Women also compete for
healthy men, meaning that the last woman to marry is indifferent between marrying a healthy
man or a frail man.2 The payoffs of the married men, except the marginal man, are increasing
in Xm. Conversely, the payoff of wives is decreasing in Xm:

Marginal man:
Other married frail men:

2

If

C + X m or

PW= Z + 2 -Xm

(6)

PHM=Y+Xm

(7)

PFM= Y-C

(8)

PFM= Y-C+(Xm -X), and Xm -X>0

< C + X m it is still the case that marriage surplus is positive.
8

(9)

Excess supply of very frail men (ESVF)
In this case women are more numerous than healthy and frail men together but
fewer in number than the total number of men. As Figure 3 shows, there are enough
women in the marriage market so that some very frail men could marry. But very frail men
cannot afford to compensate women since for them 2

X

0 , and thus the total surplus is

at most zero. As a result, all very frail men remain single.

Z+2
Z+2

X

X

Figure 3. Maximum wife’s payoff as a function of X if very frail men are in excess
supply (ESVF).

The last woman to marry is indifferent between marrying a healthy man, a frail man
and being single. In this case, not all women marry in equilibrium. The husbands, both
healthy and frail, extract all marriage surplus:
PW=Z
PHM=Y+2
PFM= Y-C+ (2 -X)
9

(10)
(11)
(12)

In the case of excess supply of women, the number of women is larger than that
of all men, and thus all men could marry. However, since very frail men always remain
single, the case of excess supply of women is equivalent to the situation in which there is an
excess supply of very frail men. Moreover, any match from which the woman obtains more
than the payoff of being single cannot be stable, since women are identical.

3.2. Testable Implications
A reduction in the number of healthy women
A variation large enough to produce a regime switch from an excess supply of
women to an excess supply of frail men will favor women and cost husbands. As Table 1
indicates, a result of the switch is that not all frail men marry anymore. Also, all husbands
receive a lower share of the marital surplus.
Next, assume the number of women is reduced even more, so that we are in the case
where there are more healthy men than women, and frail and very frail men remain single.
The welfare of all married men is decreased to their reservation utility. In other words, wives
get the entire marriage surplus.3
Excess supply of frail men is the most common regime found in the data. Therefore,
changes that occur within this regime generate relevant implications from an empirical
standpoint. Assume, for instance, that initially we are at point where marital surplus is
positive and the marginal man to marry has a certain Xm. All married men, except for the
marginal one, receive a share of the surplus generated by marriage. A ceteris paribus reduction
in the female population, assuming that the equilibrium remains in the scenario where
healthy men are fewer than women, moves the marginal man toward the smaller Xm’ and a
A switch from an excess supply of very frail men to an excess supply of frail men generates the same
implications.

3
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Table 1. Equilibrium Payoffs in Different Cases

ESHM
Marriage*

HM marry
Xm=0

Excess Supply Men
ESFM
Some FM marry , 0<Xm< X
2 -X > 0

Healthy men (HM)

Y

11

Frail men (FM)

Single: Y-C

Very frail men (VFM)

Single: Y-C

Women

Z +2

Y+X m
Married: Y-C+(Xm-X)
Single: Y-C
Single: Y-C
Z + 2 -Xm

ESVF
Xm< X
2 -X 0

Xm< X
2 -X 0

Y+2

Y+2

Y-C+(2 -X)

Y-C+(2 -X)

Single: Y-C

Single: Y-C

Z

*Marriage denotes the parameter of the marginal man to marry Xm with married men those with XM Xm
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ESW

Z

larger marital surplus. Figure 4 depicts the changes generated by a decrease in the female
population. Some frail men who were previously married are now single. All married men
receive a smaller share of the surplus while wives enjoy an increased payoff. Therefore, when
frail men are in excess, the greater the scarcity of women, the less frail the marginal man to
marry and thus the better off the wives. Symmetrically, all husbands are worse off.
Therefore, if we compare two marriage markets in the above situations, we should observe
that the wives in the market with relatively fewer women control more resources relative to
the ones in the other marriage market.

Z+2
Z+2

X

X’ m X m X

Figure 4. Changes in maximum wife’s payoff due to a decrease in the female
population (ESFM).

A general improvement in the health of men
In the case of excess supply of frail men, if the frail men competing for women
become less frail (a decrease in X) due for example to a general increase in the health of frail
men, then wives’ welfare increases while all husbands are worse off. In contrast, the same
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increase in the health of frail men, due probably to a medical technological improvement,
benefits frail husbands provided that women are more numerous than all frail men.
Another interesting implication concerns the very frail men. An large enough
improvement in their health may render them attractive as mates in the marriage market. As
a result, the very frail can compete with the frail men for a wife. This has a direct effect in
marriage markets where healthy women outnumber the population of healthy and frail men,
so that some women remain unmarried. Specifically, women that remained single previously
can now marry the very frail men that became healthier. Marriage rates are thus expected to
increase.

Policy Implications
From the previous results, frail men emerge as an important factor in the marriage
market, especially when they compete for a wife. Consider the case when women are more
numerous than healthy men, but there still is an excess of frail men. If frail men were to
receive a disability benefit, conditional on being married, then the last frail man to marry can
generate a larger marital surplus than before the policy. The consequences of this policydriven shift are that married women’s welfare increases; healthy married men are worse off;
and frail men get to enjoy their pre-policy payoff. Therefore, a policy targeted toward
helping the frail in metropolitan areas where women are more numerous than healthy men
will result in helping married women. We should observe married women work less as a
result of such a policy, and healthy husbands work more. Conversely, in metropolitan areas
where there are not enough frail men and some healthy women remain single, such a policy
would benefit the frail men and would have no welfare effects on healthy wives and

13

husbands. In such metropolitan areas one expects frail married men to work less as a result
of the policy.
Additionally, consider the case where the number of women is larger than the total
number of healthy and frail men together. In this case, some women remain single because
marriage to a very frail man makes them worse off than being single. Very frail men could
receive a disability benefit, conditional on being married, and thus afford to marry. The
effects of such a policy are that the number of marriages increases; married women
experience no welfare change; healthy and frail married men have no change in welfare; and
very frail men are better off. Therefore, a policy aimed toward helping the very frail in
marriage markets where women are more numerous than healthy and frail men will result in
an increase in welfare for the very frail men. The expected effect is that married very frail
men work less as a result of such a policy.

4. Empirical Strategy
One of the implications of the model developed above is that in marriage markets
where women marry frail men, an increased scarcity of healthy women enables them to
control a higher share of marital resources, making wives better off. To test for this increase
in relative bargaining power of wives, I consider a collective model labor supply framework.
When women’s bargaining power in the household increases, the labor supply of wives
should decline, and the labor supply of their husbands should rise.
My main sample consists of married couples with ages between 20 and 60 years. I
focus on white couples due to CPS large under-sampling. I consider local marriage markets
at the metropolitan level. I also consider men and women that have never been married and
are head of their own household and in the same age bracket as the couples. The labor
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supply of unmarried individuals should not be affected by changes in intra-household
bargaining power. I exclude widowed and separated couples and include intact couples only
if both spouses are actually present.
I estimate the following labor supply equations separately for wives and husbands:

h f = h f (ln w f , ln w m , y, X , Health Ratio) +

f

(13)

h m = h m (ln w f , ln w m , y, X , Health Ratio) +

m

(14)

I also estimate a corresponding labor supply equation for unmarried women and
men, using the same specification except for the spousal variables.
Health Ratio is a measure of mate availability in the marriage market. It is a sex ratio
type measure, computed as the number of healthy men over the number of healthy women.
I construct this variable for Whites by metropolitan area. There is evidence in the literature
that there is relatively little benefit from computing sex ratios separately by marital status,
while the exclusion of both institutionalized individuals and homosexuals is recommended
(Fosset and Kiecolt 1991, Freiden 1974). My measure is derived for the civilian noninstitutionalized population. For the group of homosexuals I construct the variable named
same-sex unmarried households ratio. This ratio is computed as the total number of male
and female same-sex unions divided by the total number of households in a metropolitan
area. Thus, provided that the sizes of the male and female homosexual populations vary
together, their impact on the accuracy of the health sex ratio would be reduced (Fosset and
Kiecolt 1991). Finally, each individual is assigned the corresponding ratio in the metropolitan
area of residence. I focus on White individuals and racially homogeneous couples, assuming
that the relevant marriage market is limited to one’s own race. The impact of the health ratio
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on the labor supply of spouses is captured by the coefficient on Health Ratio. I consider the
following health categories: healthy, frail and very frail. Healthy includes people with no
disability; frail includes individuals with only one disability; and very frail refers to two or
more types of disability. The next subsection defines these health conditions in detail. In all
my regressions I include only those marriage markets where healthy women are more
numerous than healthy men (Health Ratio<1), but less numerous than healthy and frail men
together. Additionally, I include the number of very frail men, total men and the ratio of
healthy men to frail men to control for the health distribution of men.4
Other covariates include the own wage rate w, the spouse’s wage rate and household
non-labor income y. These covariates include individual-level characteristics such as age,
education and health status of each spouse, number of members and number of young
children in the family. I use the health status covariate and an indicator variable for the
presence of work-limiting disabilities to identify healthy wives and exclude women that
report fair or poor health. State and metropolitan level variables such as state unemployment
rate, state female labor force participation, population density and per capita income are
included to account for local differences in employment opportunities and the level of
economic activity. The dependent variable in the labor supply regressions is annual hours
worked, defined as total annual hours worked on the longest job held in 1999. The sample
includes only households in which men have positive hours of work. Labor supply
regressions for married and single women are run with Heckman MLE to correct for sample
selection. However, the results for women remain unchanged when I exclude the nonparticipants. The labor supply regressions are estimated using robust standard errors

These conditions insure the ceteris paribus reduction in the female population. An increase in the Health
Ratio due to simultaneous changes in the number of men and women would have ambiguous welfare effects.

4
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clustered by metropolitan area, which allow for correlation of households’ observations
within metropolitan areas.
I also estimate the same specification allowing for non-participation for both wives
and husbands. The own and spouse’s hourly wage is replaced for all observations by the
fitted values derived from a conventional wage equation estimated for participating wives
and husbands with a correction for selection bias. Health Ratio effects are robust to this
specification.

5. Data
Estimation is carried out on the March Supplement of the Current Population
Survey (CPS) for the year 2000. U.S. Census data are used to construct the health sex ratio
by health status, race and age group. Husbands and wives from single-family households
were extracted from the CPS into separate files. Records in these files were then matched on
the household ID code to create a single observation for each married couple. Data on labor
force activity, income, self reported health status and other household level variables come
from the March Supplement, to which I merge data on health ratios from the Summary File
4 of the Census. Summary File 4 (SF4) contains information compiled from the questions
asked to a sample of all people and housing units and is released as individual files for each
of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and for the United States overall. I
use the cross-tabulations by sex, age, race and disability status to construct separate health
ratios for the white population, aged 21 to 64 by metropolitan area.5
Specifically, disability types are defined as follows: (a) blindness, deafness or a severe
vision or hearing impairment (sensory disability); (b) a condition that substantially limits one
I also construct ratios for the Black population but given CPS large under-sampling I have too few couples to
use them. The age brackets in SF4 (PCT69) are 5-15; 16-20; 21-64 and above 65.

5
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or more basic physical activities, such as walking, climbing stairs, reaching, lifting or carrying
(physical disability) and if the individual had a physical, mental or emotional condition lasting
six months or more that made difficult; (c) learning, remembering or concentrating (mental
disability); (d) dressing, bathing or getting around inside the home (self-care disability); (e)
going outside the home alone to shop or visit a doctor’s office (going outside the home
disability); (f) working at a job or business (employment disability). Throughout the analysis,
the term frail refers to people that suffer from only one of these disabling conditions while
very frail refers to individuals that have at least two of these conditions.
The total number of U.S. metropolitan areas is 276 (excluding Puerto Rico). Merging
the Census and CPS data reduces the number of metropolitan areas to 191. Nineteen
metropolitan areas are lost after keeping only the relevant marriage markets. The remaining
172 metropolitan areas comprise approximately 95 percent of the total number of White
couples. The state unemployment rate and state female labor force participation are retrieved
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, while the measure of the prevalence of same-sex
unmarried households by metropolitan area comes from the U.S. Census 2000, Summary
File 4 (table PCT21). The Census records a household as a same-sex union if the relationship
to the householder is specified as “unmarried partner”. I construct one measure for the
prevalence of same sex households as the total number of homosexual and lesbian unions
out of the total number of households in a metropolitan area. In my sample, the covariate
health dummies are derived from the self-reported health status information that the CPS
provides.6 Finally, CPS weights are used to make the sample representative of the U.S.
population and economy.

Those are: excellent health, very good, good fair and poor health. The excluded category in the specifications
is excellent health.
6
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Descriptive statistics for the main demographic groups and variables are presented in
Table 2. In my sample, men work more annual hours than women on average and earn a
higher hourly wage. Husbands are, on average, two years older than wives, and they have
similar levels of education. The health sex ratio by metropolitan area is already restricted to
local marriage markets where the number of healthy women is larger than the number of
healthy men.

6. Results
The main results are shown in Table 3. The estimated effects of the health ratio are
positive for husbands and negative for wives, as predicted by the theory. The point estimates
in my sample indicate that a 10 percentage point increase in the health sex ratio reduces
wives’ annual labor supply by about 94.4 hours, while their husbands’ is increased by 68.5
hours per year.
The health ratio effects correspond to a 5.1 percentage point reduction of the
average annual hours worked by healthy married women and to a 3 percentage point
increase for their corresponding husbands. The elasticity of the response (calculated at the
means of the data) for wives has the value of -0.49. Husbands’ labor supply elasticity with
respect to the health ratio is 0.28.
The health ratio effect is also estimated for unmarried individuals, separately for men
and women. As the model predicts, their labor supply regressions show no significant impact
of the health sex ratio (Table 4). Moreover, the fact that both coefficients do not have
negligible magnitudes is counterbalanced by their sign, i.e. opposite to the predicted
direction for wives and husbands. However, the coefficients are systematically insignificant.
The small size of the sample of unmarried individuals may contribute to the lack of precision
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Table 2. Summary Statistics
All Couples
Variable

mean

Hours worked by wife*
Hours worked by husband*
Log of wage of wife*
Log of wage of husband*
Age of husband
Age of wife
Education of husband
Education of wife
Household non-labor income
Number of children aged 0 6
Number of family members
Husband's health status
Very good
Good
Fair
Poor
Wife's health status
Very good
Good
Health ratio**
Number of observations

1786.00
632.94
2277.40
462.36
2.52
0.69
2.92
0.59
41.90
7.98
39.76
7.86
13.91
2.83
13.85
2.60
5378.42 13580.67
0.32
0.62
3.42
1.17

Single Women
Variable
Hours worked*
Log of wage*
Age
Education
Household non-labor income
Number of children aged 06
Number of family members
Health status
Very good
Good
Fair
Poor
Number of observations

std. dev

0.37
0.19
0.02
0.003

0.48
0.39
0.14
0.06

0.39
0.21
0.93
5325

0.48
0.4
0.02

Single Men

mean std. dev

mean

std. dev

1828.78 546.87
2.23
0.64
31.80
8.12
12.28
2.95
3698.33 6149.04
0.57
0.74
2.71
1.09

2011.90
2.47
32.38
12.73
4004.57
0.12
2.52

487.73
0.61
9.13
3.38
9749.15
0.43
0.95

0.31
0.22
0.06
0.02
80

0.46
0.42
0.24
0.14

0.42
0.31

0.49
0.46

323

The sample contains data from the March supplement year 2000 and U.S. Census 2000.
*For women and men with positive hours of work.
Single individuals are defined as those with marital status "never married".
**Statistics for the 171 metropolitan areas
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The small size of the sample of unmarried individuals may contribute to the lack of
precision in estimation.7 These results lend empirical support for the bargaining power effect
of mate availability as a measure of outside marriage market opportunities on husbands and
wives.
Additionally, I find that spousal labor supply is decreasing with own health
deterioration and that wives, in particular, work more as the health of their spouse declines.
The latter result is in line with previous empirical studies that document increases in wives’
labor supply as husbands’ health deteriorates (Berger and Fleisher 1984, Berger 1983 and
Parsons 1977). This finding addresses the possibility that the estimated negative health ratio
effect on wives’ labor supply reflects women’s decision to reduce their market work and
provide care to their spouse. Couples containing frail spouses might gain from specializing in
home care provision. For instance wives could specialize and provide care to their spouses
by reducing their amount of labor market work. These results actually show that healthy
wives increase their market work most probably to compensate for the loss in household
earnings. Thus, controlling for the health status of spouses should account for any effects of
the health gap within the couple on the labor supplies of spouses.
I also estimate the impact of the health ratio on a sample of couples that included the
few Black couples that lived in metropolitan areas where men, both healthy and frail,
exceeded the number of healthy women. I find a similar pattern of results as in the main
specification.

I also estimate labor supplies for the broader category of single people that includes widows and divorcees
and, while the sample size more than triples, the coefficients drop dramatically in magnitude and remain
insignificant.

7
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Table 3. Labor Supply Regressions (Annual Hours)

Wives
-944.59
(519.48)
140.19
(19.73)
-114.20
(16.66)
5.03
(4.37)
2.72
(2.42)
-1.97
(2.53)
-20.12
(4.50)
24.58
(4.15)
-2.60
(0.6)
-138.93
(18.79)
-84.81
(10.45)

Health Ratio
Log of wage of wife
Log of wage of husband
Log of wage of wife*Log of wage of husband
Age of husband
Age of wife
Education of husband
Education of wife
Household non-labor income
Number of children aged<6
Number of household members
Husband's health status (Excellent- excluded)
Very good

*
***
***

***
***
***
***
***

66.12 **
(34.10)
134.2 ***
(37.64)
126.49 **
(63.96)
137.22
(117.36)

Good
Fair
Poor
Wife's health status (Excellent -excluded)
Very good

Husbands
685.54
(381.51)
-27.17
(17.30)
-10.27
(14.60)
2.27
(5.52)
-1.70
(1.7)
0.89
(1.69)
15.58
(3.38)
9.68
(3.53)
1.50
(0.6)
-15.55
(12.67)
4.19
(6.99)

Inverse Mill's ratio
Observations

Data from March CPS year 2000. ***, **, * denote 1, 5 and 10-percent significance levels
Wives' supply is estimated using Heckman MLE. Robust standard errors in paranthesis
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***
***
***

-16.14
(18.11)
-88.53 **
(27.74)
-244.57 ***
(57.83)
-560.31 ***
(196.32)

-15.92
(33.14)
-120.3 ***
(35.04)
17.21
(16.01)
6761

Good

*

16.95
(21.08)
-10.06
(30.08)
5325

Table 4. Effect of Health Ratio on Annual Hours Worked, by Demographic Group

All Couples

Staggered Age Couples

Singles
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Wives

-944.59 *
(523.23)
6,761

-1289.70 **
(616.4)
5,070

Women

Husbands

685.54 *
(381.51)
5,325

932.67 **
(471.34)
3,904

Men

The sample contains data from the March supplement year 2000.
All tables report regressions run on the same set of covariates described in Section 4.
All couples are those with wives 55 years old or younger and husbands at most 58
Staggered age couples are defined as those with wives 45 years old or younger.
Women's labor supply is estimated using Heckman's Selection Model
Single individuals are defined as those with marital status "all but separated".
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2265.50
(1618)
323
-3363.00
(0.206)
80

The bargaining power effect of the health ratio is also estimated on a sub-sample of
couples in which wives are younger than their husbands, using the same specification as
above. As Table 4 shows, wives in their mid-forties and younger exhibit a stronger impact
of the health sex ratio compared to the entire sample. A ten percentage point increase in the
health ratio is associated with a decline in wives’ annual labor supply of 128 hours (p-value
=.05) and a corresponding increase for husbands of 93.2 hours (p-value =.04). Furthermore,
the magnitude of the differential impact is sizable, as wives married to older men reduce
their labor supply by an extra 30 percent compared to the ones married to more similarly
aged husbands. Also, single women in this age bracket experience no bargaining effect. This
highlights the fact that the information embedded in the health status gains more
significance with age. Women married to older men are affected by an increase in the
availability of healthy mates in two ways: (1) their outside marriage market opportunities are
improved since there are more men similar to their husbands, and (2) there are also more of
the younger, healthy men available. Thus, one would expect older husbands’ labor supply
response to be stronger relative to all the other husbands (36 percent more annual hours).
Moreover, older husbands might work more so that they can save more, and thus offer more
in terms of bequests. This result is in line with recent evidence showing that couples where
the wife has more relative bargaining power save more (Lundberg, Ward-Batts 2004).
I also estimate the same specification allowing for non-participation for both wives
and husbands. The own and spouse’s hourly wage is replaced for all observations by the
fitted values derived from a conventional wage equation estimated for participating wives
and husbands with a correction for selection bias. Health Ratio effects are robust to this
specification. As Table 5 shows, the specification described above yields similar results to
the specification in Table 4. For a complete comparison I also report the results of a simple
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OLS model of labor supply. However, the latter specification is not recommended for the
estimation of female labor supply because of the selection bias issues caused by nonparticipating women.
The empirical results support the predictions of the model developed in Section 3.
For metropolitan areas characterized by a shortage of healthy women relative to healthy and
frail men together, an increase in the health ratio enables wives to work less. Husbands, both
healthy and frail, experience an increase in their annual labor supply.
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Table 5. Effect of Health Ratio on Annual Hours Worked, Different Specifications
OLS

Sample Selection (Wives)

Sample Selection (All)
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Wives

-912.5 *
(523.23)
5,325

-944.59 *
(519.48)
6,761

-1183.7 **
(504.46)
7,027

Husbands

685.54 *
(381.51)
5,325

685.54 *
(381.51)
5,325

670.6 **
(349.10)
7,027

The sample contains data from the March supplement year 2000.
All tables report regressions run on the same set of covariates described in Section 4.
All couples are those with wives 55 years old or younger and husbands at most 58
Staggered age couples are defined as those with wives 45 years old or younger.
Women's labor supply is estimated using Heckman's Selection Model
Single individuals are defined as those with marital status "all but separated".
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7. Conclusions
This paper models the impact of the availability of healthy mates in the marriage
market on intra-household bargaining power. The scarcity of healthy wives generates an
increase in their bargaining power, provided that frail men marry, while both healthy and
frail husbands experience a decrease in their welfare. I test this prediction empirically, relying
on the result of the collective model that an increase in intra-household bargaining power
reduces labor supply. Using CPS and Census data for year 2000, I construct a health sex ratio
to measure mate availability. My findings indicate that if the corresponding health sex ratio
becomes more favorable to women, married women significantly reduce their supply of
labor, while their husbands increase theirs. Consistent with the model’s predictions,
unmarried men and women exhibit no significant impact of the health sex ratio on their
labor supply. This study provides a first empirical support of the bargaining power effect of
the availability of healthy mates in the marriage market.
The theoretical model developed in Section 3 provides a framework for studies of
mate availability effects on intra-household bargaining power and also generates testable
policy implications. Dimensions other than disability can be used to empirically describe
population health status, e.g. obesity, alcoholism etc. More generally, other qualitative
aspects of mate availability can be analyzed using this framework in order to investigate their
impact on intra-household allocations.
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CHAPTER TWO
QUALITY OF AVAILABLE MATES, EDUCATION
AND HOUSEHOLD LABOR SUPPLY

1. Introduction
This paper examines the effects of local quality sex ratios by metropolitan area and
educational attainment on spouses’ labor supply and bargaining power, using individual level
data from 2000, 1990 and 1980. There is evidence in the literature that the availability of
potential mates affects the labor market decisions of married individuals, with mate
availability measured as the raw number of men relative to the number of women in
aggregate marriage markets (e.g. Chiappori, Fortin, Lacroix, 2002; Angrist, 2002). However,
the literature on sex ratios emphasizes that both the local dimension of spouse availability
and the economic attractiveness of mates play a large role in marital behavior in the U.S.
(Fossett and Kielcolt, 1991; Lichter, LeClere and McLaughlin, 1991).
In this study, we further explore the role of sex ratios on bargaining power and
spouses’ labor supplies by constructing a refined availability measure which reflects both the
local nature of marriage market conditions and their quality. We focus on educational
attainment as our qualitative indicator. Education is commonly regarded as a valuable trait in
marriage by which individuals assortatively match (Weiss and Willis, 1997; Qian 1998). We
consider local marriage markets at the metropolitan level and construct a sex ratio by three
education brackets (high-school graduates, some college and college-college plus), within
which individuals usually sort. In the framework of a collective labor supply household
model, we test whether this quality sex ratio affects the intra-household bargaining power of
29

couples in the corresponding education bracket. Specifically, when the sex ratio is favorable
to the wife, (i.e. there is a relative scarcity of women in her education bracket) the
distribution of gains from marriage is shifted in her favor, generating opposite income
effects on spouses. In particular, according to collective models, if a higher number of
qualified men in the wife’s marriage group of reference increases female intra-household
bargaining power, then one would expect a reduction in wives’ labor supply, and an increase
in husbands’ labor supply (Chiappori et al., 2002). We also test the prediction that the
bargaining power effect of such a sex ratio is greater as the assortative mating order by
education increases (Iyigun and Walsh, 2007).
We use Census data at the metropolitan level for the recent decades of 2000, 1990
and 1980 to build our sex ratios. We add data from the March Supplement of the Current
Population Survey (CPS) for the same years to test our labor supply prediction on married
couples, using unmarried individuals as control group. Our identification strategy consists of
estimating the effects of education sex ratios on husbands’ and wives’ labor supply and
comparing changes in their labor supply behavior cross-sectionally across the U.S.
metropolitan areas.
Our empirical analysis reveals that married women significantly reduce their supply
of market labor, while their husbands increase theirs, as the corresponding education sex
ratio becomes more favorable to women. Results are similar across decades, with a stronger
impact in 1980. For instance, in 2000 we find that a 10 percentage point increase in the
education sex ratio decreases annual hours worked of “some college” and “college-college
plus” wives by 10 and 26.3, respectively, and increases their husbands’ by 4 and 9.6, while
high-school graduates do not exhibit any significant impact. Consistent with the hypothesis
of a stronger effect for higher education brackets, we also find that couples with “college-
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college plus” wives exhibit a significantly stronger impact of the quality sex ratio on their
bargaining power than couples with “some college” wives, whose estimated quality sex ratio
coefficient is in turn larger than that for high school graduates. Our bargaining power
interpretation is strengthened by the fact that unmarried men and women do not exhibit any
significant reaction to the quality sex ratio on their labor supply.
The findings presented here are consistent with theories which predict that higher
sex ratios in the marriage market increase female bargaining power. Moreover, this study
represents the first empirical support for the bargaining power effect of a local quality sex
ratio by education, and for its stronger impact on couples with higher levels of educational
attainment. Our results clearly indicate that local area variations in couples’ labor supply are
directly linked to the relative scarcity of economically attractive mates. Both the local and
quality dimensions of sex ratios are relevant to explaining household behavior.
A number of alternative explanations are considered. The geographical variation in
the relative number of men and women by education may capture differences in local labor
market opportunities for women, in marital gains from specialization and in welfare
programs or in the prevalence of married and same-sex partners who do not represent
available mates. We argue that these phenomena cannot consistently explain our results,
given our intra-household bargaining predictions and empirical evidence.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical framework.
Section 3 describes the empirical specification and data. Section 4 presents the empirical
results. Section 5 considers alternative explanations for the findings. Section 6 concludes the
paper.
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2. Theoretical Background
There are two strands of economic literature related to our study. One strand focuses
on the impact of the sex ratio on marriage markets, spouses’ bargaining power and labor
supply behavior. Specifically, studies such as Chiappori et al. (2002) and Chiappori et al.
(2005) develop a collective household model and demonstrate that favorable outside
marriage market opportunities increase a spouse’s bargaining power through an income
effect, measured as a reduction in labor supply. The opposite effect occurs for the other
spouse. This is due to the fact that married men and women have the option of seeking a
divorce and re-marrying. Therefore, more numerous potential mates in the marriage market
of reference should affect the bargaining power of those already married, to the extent that
this affects their opportunities outside the marriage. It is widely acknowledged in the
literature that married people are responsive to shifts in outside factors, which can lead to
income and bargaining power redistribution between spouses and changes in labor supply
(Chiappori et al., 2002, Grossbard-Shechtman, 1984, Lundberg and Pollak, 1996). Our paper
specifically refers to this theoretical framework. Finally, a relevant theoretical result is
provided by Iyigun and Walsh (2007), who incorporate assortative spousal matching into the
collective household model and find that sex ratios have a stronger impact on intrahousehold allocations as the assortative rank of couples rises.
The literature also provides empirical evidence about the effects of quantity sex ratios on
labor supply. Chiappori et al. (2002) find that higher sex ratios reduce wives’ labor supply
and increase the husbands’, using 1990 state Census and PSID data. In a study about
immigrants to the United States, Angrist (2002) finds that higher sex ratios by ethnicity affect
female labor market decisions. He argues that these empirical results are consistent with
theories which predict that higher sex ratios increase female bargaining power in the
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marriage market. Using data at both household and aggregate level, Grossbard-Shechtman
and Neideffer (1997) and Grossbard-Shechtman (1993) show that increases in local and
aggregate quantity sex ratios reduce the labor force participation and hours worked of
married women. However, both the local dimension of spouse availability and the economic
attractiveness of mates are relevant marriage market conditions (Fossett and Kielcolt, 1991;
Lichter et al., 1991). Our analysis takes into account both of these aspects simultaneously.
The second strand of literature that is related to our paper concerns the spousal
sorting by educational attainment and the gains to marriage from education. Spouses have
increasingly similar educational attainment, especially among highly educated people (Qian,
1998). Specifically, sorting has mainly increased from 1960 to late 1980s, when gender roles
have become more egalitarian and social distance between education groups increased (Mare
and Schwartz, 2005). In this respect the years 1990 and 2000 are similar. Mare and Schwartz
(2005) also report that today husbands and wives are roughly four times as likely to have a
spouse who shares their educational background as they are to be married to someone who
does not, educational homogamy being particularly strong for college graduates. Strong
sorting based on educational attainment is also documented by Weiss and Willis (1997), with
the additional finding that similarity in schooling increases marriage stability. Schooling also
has cross-productivity effects on spouses in the sense that wives’ education is found to
increase the productivity and wages of their husbands and vice-versa (Chiappori et al., 2005;
Tiefenthaler, 1997; Benham, 1974).
However, none of these studies explores how the distribution of educational
attainment of men and women in local marriage markets affects intra-household bargaining
power. There is also no evidence on whether this impact is increasing with higher
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educational rank of couples. Analyzing these effects of quality sex ratios by education is the
focus of our paper.

3. Empirical Specification and Data
3.1 Identification Strategy
Our main sample consists of married couples with both spouses between 22 and 60
years of age. According to the theory, if the scarcity of educated women in the local marriage
market enhances women’s bargaining power in the household, then the labor supply of
wives should decline and the labor supply of their husbands should rise. Additionally,
couples in higher education categories should experience a stronger impact on their labor
supplies relative to other education categories. We also consider unmarried men and women
in the same age bracket, focusing on singles as a “control” group. In principle, singles’ labor
supplies should not be affected by changes in intra-household bargaining power. They may
experience expected marital gains or losses, if they plan to marry in the future. However, in
our analysis the source of variation of bargaining power is the sex ratio, which is time variant
and not an acquired right. Singles should not perceive its current fluctuations as certain
future bargaining power shifts, as it would happen with divorce or abortion laws lasting over
time. Therefore, consistent with Chiappori et al. (2002) we do not predict any effect on
singles’ labor supply. We include intact couples only if both spouses are actually present. We
exclude widowed and separated couples, in order to keep a clear distinction between
multiple and one decision maker households8.

8

For the same reason, we exclude singles that are not the head of their own household, even though their
sample size is reduced. However, the sample size for a cross-section is comparable to the number of
observations of singles in Chiappori et al. (2002).
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The following equations for labor supply are estimated separately for wives and
husbands:
hf =
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We also estimate a corresponding labor supply equation for unmarried women and men,
using the same specification except for spousal variables:
hu =
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EdR is our sex ratio, which is constructed by three education brackets, two races and by
metropolitan area, in order to capture the economic attractiveness of local mates. We assign
to each individual the corresponding ratio of the number of men over the number of women
of his/her race, educational category and that live in his/her metropolitan area. For couples,
our sex ratio EdR corresponds to the number of men over women that are of the same race
and education category as the wife of each household. As to race, we focus on black and
white individuals and on couples where spouses are of the same race, assuming that the
relevant marriage market is limited to one’s own race. The coefficient of EdR is common to
both races. We consider the following education categories: high-school graduates (HS),
some college (SC) and college graduate- college plus (CC). HS includes people with highschool diploma, or equivalent; SC includes individuals with some college, with or without an
associate degree; and CC refers to bachelor’s degree and above. We exclude high-school
dropouts from our analysis to keep our sample homogeneous, since high-school dropouts
are characterized by traits, socioeconomic characteristics and marriage market prospects that
are different from those of graduates (Eckstein and Wolpin, 1999; Rumberger, 1983). We
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compute our sex ratio including men and women aged 18 to 64 following Fossett and
Kiecolt, (1991) who find that measures of the sex ratio based on broad age ranges are
satisfactory and may be preferable to sex ratios computed for narrower age ranges9.
The interactions of EdR with the dummy variables for the education brackets SC
and CC, capture the differential effect of our sex ratio for higher education categories. The
education dummies refer to the education of the wife and our omitted category is highschool graduates. Our identification strategy of the bargaining power effect consists of
estimating

1

,

2

,

3

for wives and

1

,

2

,

for husbands. The impact of the education sex

3

ratio on the labor supply of high-school graduate wives and their husbands is captured by
1

and

1

respectively. The terms

(

1

+

2

)

and

(

1

+
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)

measure the impact of the

education sex ratio on the labor supply of some-college and college-college plus wives. The
corresponding impacts for husbands is measured by the terms

(

1

+

2

)

and (

1

+

3

),

respectively.
The other regressors are the wage rate w i (of spouse i or of unmarried individual u),
household non-labor income y, and a vector of covariates X. X includes age, experience,
education of each spouse, a dummy variable for race, number of household members and
number of (young) children in the family. X also includes state unemployment rate, state
total labor force participation and female labor force participation, to control for the level of
economic activity in a state and especially for employment opportunities. We add two

Research shows that people consider mates drawn from relatively broad age ranges. While mean age
differences between husbands and wives are relatively small, there is considerable variation around this central
tendency as many marriages involve larger age differences. Competition and substitution across age categories
is considerable (Fosset and Kiecolt, 1993). Sex ratios accounting for wives being younger than husbands are
reported to have the same impact (Chiappori et al., 2002). We also compute the sex ratio for the age bracket 18
to 44 and obtain similar results.
9
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measures of the prevalence of same-sex unmarried households by metropolitan area, for
homosexuals and lesbians in 2000 and 1990 only, as same-sex households were not recorded
in 1980. The purpose of including these two variables is to keep our education sex ratio as
closely related to the heterosexual marriage markets as possible.
The dependent variable in our labor supply regressions is annual hours worked,
defined as total annual hours worked on the longest job held in the previous year.
Households in which the wife or the husband does not work are also included in our
samples and we account for a possible selection bias toward working men and women by
correcting for sample selection with Heckman MLE10. As source of identification, we use
distributional assumptions on the first step residuals alone or exclusion restrictions11. Both
procedures yield similar robust results. All female and male labor supply regressions exhibit
the same results when estimated without selection correction. We use predicted wages to
measure the non-working spouses’ wages and to address the possible endogeneity of
individuals’ observed wages. To predict individuals’ wages, we take a standard human capital
approach, also implemented in the collective labor supply literature (e.g., Donni, 2005), and
consider a wage equation in which wage depends on the individual’s age, race, education,
education squared and cubed, but does not depend on his/her spouse’s characteristics. This
equation is then estimated separately for participating wives, husbands, single men,\ and
single women, with a correction for selection bias12. The generated fitted values then replace

10 We only exclude household observations where neither spouse works, given that this analysis measures
bargaining power changes through labor supply. The inclusion of non-working men is relevant given the
decrease in male labor force participation rates in the past 30 years.
11 The latter are presence of young children or number of family members only affecting the participation
decision but not labor supply. Tables report estimation with identification from statistical distribution
assumptions.
12 The participation decision depends on the number of children, dummies for age brackets, education, race
and measures of local economy.
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the wage observations of the corresponding individuals in our samples13. Finally, Wald tests
of overall statistical significance performed on the above labor supply regressions do not
reject the validity of the framework we use.
We run our labor supply regressions using robust standard errors clustered by
metropolitan area, which allows for correlation of household observations within
metropolitan areas. Our specifications do not use a differences-in-differences estimator:
husbands’ and wives’ regressions, as well as singles’, are estimated separately from one
another. As such, they should not suffer from the understated standard errors highlighted by
Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004). At any rate, clustering by metropolitan area should
rectify such an underestimation, if it is present.
We assume sorting within education brackets. We compute the extent of sorting in
our own sample, and find that the percentage of couples who have spouses with education
levels in the same bracket (high-school graduates, some college and college-college plus) is
58.5 % in 2000, 57.5 % in 1990 and 55 % in 1980. The correlation of spouses’ education
across education brackets is about .52 for all three decades. These figures are very similar to
those reported by the literature acknowledging education assortative mating. Specifically,
Chiappori et al. (2007) state that the proportion of spouses who have the same level of
education remained fairly constant over time at about 50 %. Weiss and Willis (1997) find
that the correlation in educational attainments of spouses is on average .57 (around year
1980) and report that this strong correlation is similar in magnitude to the correlations found
in many other samples in the United States and other countries.

13

Tables report estimation with the predicted spouse’s and own wages.
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3.2 Data
Estimation is carried out on the March Supplements of the Current Population
Survey (CPS), for the years 2000, 1990 and 1980. The U.S. Census data for the
corresponding years is used to construct our education sex ratio by education brackets, race
and age groups. Unmarried individuals and husbands and wives from one-family households
were extracted from the CPS into separate files. Records in these files were then matched on
the household identification code to create a single observation for each married couple.
Data on labor force activity, income and any variable of interest at the household level are
taken from the March Supplements. In particular, the covariate education is derived from
the education categories that the CPS provides14. CPS weights are used to make the sample
representative of the U.S. population and economy. To this sample we merge data on
education ratios from the Summary Files 4 of the Census for 2000 and 1990 and from
Chapter C of Volume 1 of the Census for 1980. Summary File 4 (SF4) and Chapter C
contain information compiled from the questions asked to a sample of all people and
housing units and is released as individual files for each of the 50 states, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico and for the United States overall. We use the cross-tabulations by
sex, age, race and educational attainment to construct separate education ratios for the black
and white population aged 18 to 64, by metropolitan area15. In 2000, the Census identifies
276 U.S. metropolitan areas excluding Puerto Rico; in 1990 and 1980, the total identified
areas are 284 and 288, respectively. We merge these to the CPS data and keep the
metropolitan areas present in both data sets. We also exclude the top and bottom 2 %
In CPS 2000, education is recorded as degrees attained rather than years of schooling completed as in 1990
and 1980. We thus assigned number of years of schooling to the corresponding degrees.
15 In 1980, the available cross-tabulations only provide the age bracket “25 and older”. Also, the education
brackets in Census are focused on years of schooling rather than degrees obtained as is the case of the
following decades. However, the broad education categories and age ranges used to construct our education
ratio are not affected.
14
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metropolitan ratios’ outliers. This leaves us with 173 metropolitan areas in 2000, 181 in 1990
and 34 in 198016. The state unemployment rate, state total labor force participation and
female labor force participation are retrieved from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The two
measures of the prevalence of same-sex unmarried households come from tabulations in
SF4 and are computed at the metropolitan level. In 2000 and 1990, the Census records a
household as a same-sex union if the relationship to the householder is specified as
“unmarried partner”. We construct two ratios, the number of homosexual unions out of the
total number of households and the number of lesbian unions out of the total number of
households.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables by year and
demographic group. In our samples, men on average work more annual hours than women
and earn a higher hourly wage, while they have similar levels of education. On average,
husbands are two years older than wives. As to our education sex ratio by metropolitan area,
there are more white women graduating from high school, or having some college education,
than white men. On the other hand, there are more white men than women holding a
college degree or above, but the gap has been decreasing over time. The pattern is somewhat
different for the black population: fewer black women hold a high school diploma relative to
black men but they are more numerous in the “some college” category.

The available number in 1980 is so small due to the fact that the CPS identifies only 44 metropolitan areas in
1980.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
2000
White
Variable
Education Ratio HS graduates
Education Ratio Some College
Education Ratio College & above
Number of observations*

1990
Black

mean

std. dev

0.98
0.89
1.02
173

0.06
0.05
0.07

Wives
Variable

mean

std. dev

Hours worked**
Log of wage**
Age
Education
Household non-labor income
Number of children below age 6
Number of family members
Dummy for black
Number of observations

1745.5
2.59
39.18
14.19
6153
0.415
3.5
0.088
9235

713.46
0.72
7.88
2.16
14748
0.7
1.19
0.28
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Single Women
Variable

mean

std. dev

Hours worked**
Log of wage**
Age
Education
Household non-labor income
Number of children below age 6
Number of family members
Dummy for black
Number of observations

1759.2
2.24
32.81
13.17
3601
0.53
2.75
0.6
696

652.6
0.77
8.88
1.68
5971
0.71
1.02
0.48

mean std. dev
1.22
0.94
0.95
173

1980

White

Black

White

Black

mean std. dev

mean std. dev

mean std. dev

mean std. dev

0.63
0.43
0.48

0.86
0.92
1.21
181

0.07
0.06
0.09

1.03
0.95
1.06
181

0.41
0.47
0.53

0.7
0.96
1.5
34

0.04
0.08
0.08

Husbands

Wives

Husbands

mean std. dev

mean std. dev

mean std. dev

mean std. dev

1638.4 722.51
2.19
0.67
40.49
9.75
13.8
2.03
5154 12569
0.37
0.68
3.4
1.19
0.07
0.25
11894

2223.85 568.64
2.69
0.61
42.88 10.13
14.33
2.22
5154 12569
0.37
0.68
3.4
1.19
0.07
0.25
11894

1464.74 743.14
1.57
0.75
36.33
8.87
13.44
1.9
1810
5572
0.42
0.69
3.66
1.31
0.075
0.29
4597

2309.25
3.01
41.2
14.44
6153
0.415
3.5
0.088
9235

547.44
0.64
8
2.37
14748
0.7
1.19
0.28

Single Men
mean std. dev
2098.87
2.66
37.92
13.68
6885
0.094
2.36
0.3
153

583.45
0.58
8.44
2.15
13938
0.36
0.8
0.46

Single Women

Single Men

Wives

Single Women

mean std. dev

mean std. dev

mean std. dev

1775.8 632.01
1.98
0.63
32.21
8.08
12.96
1.68
3634
5433
0.58
0.77
2.76
1.05
0.62
0.48
562

2057.73 525.43
2.34
0.65
34.59
10.3
13.71
2.04
5352
9264
0.11
0.43
2.46
0.8
0.19
0.39
185

1670.07 629.77
1.55
0.62
34.98
9.88
12.9
1.57
3076
4907
0.45
0.68
2.97
1.13
0.47
0.49
548

The sample contains data from the CPS March supplement and U.S. Census years 2000, 1990 and 1980.
*Number of Census metropolitan areas present in the CPS sample.
**For women and men with positive hours of work.
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0.78
0.9
0.95
34

0.09
0.14
0.25

Husbands
mean std. dev
2211.3
2.21
39.17
13.44
1810
0.42
3.66
0.075
4597

492
0.59
9.42
1.9
5572
0.69
1.31
0.29

Single Men
mean std. dev
2001.4
2.02
35.61
13.87
2923
0.072
2.62
0.19
107

528.29
0.54
10.43
1.92
4657
0.26
0.94
0.39

4. Results
4.1 Main evidence
The main results are shown in Tables 2 and 3. In all the three decades, the estimated
effects of our quality sex ratio are positive for husbands and negative for wives, as predicted
by the theory. Additionally, couples with CC wives exhibit a stronger response to the quality
sex ratio on their bargaining power than couples with “some college” wives. In turn, SC
wives estimated quality sex ratio coefficient is larger than for high school graduates wives.
The point estimates in our samples indicate that in 2000 (columns 1 and 2 of Table 2) a 10
percentage point increase in the education sex ratio reduces SC wives’ annual labor supply by
about 10 hours (P value = .001), while their husbands’ is increased by 4 hours (P value =
.06). As to couples with CC wives, their coefficients for the education sex ratio show a
decline in wives’ labor supply by 26.3 hours (P value = .001), and an increase in their
husbands’ by 9.6 hours per year (P value = .05). 1990 exhibits a similar impact (columns 3
and 4 of Table 2). The evidence clearly shows that in recent years for both husbands and
wives the estimates for the “college-college plus” are greater than for “some college”, the
coefficients being statistically different from each other for each spouse. This suggests that
changes in the sex ratio of one’s education group have a stronger effect on bargaining power
if one is highly educated. High-school graduates do not show any significant response to
changing ratios17. As reported in columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 the 1980 sample exhibits a
similar pattern of effects between spouses and across education brackets, although their
magnitude is larger than in 1990 and 2000. Most notable is the strong impact for the highest
education bracket.

17

The absence of such a bargaining power effect may be due to strong rigidities in the labor supply schedules
of such low-educated couples, or to the lack of sorting behavior by this demographic group. See subsection 4.4
for a more detailed discussion.
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Table 2. Estimation of the Labor Supply Regressions of Wives and Husbands
2000

Education Ratio
Education Ratio x dummy SC
Education Ratio x dummy CC
Log of wage of wife
Log of wage of husband
Age of husband
Age of wife
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Education of husband
Education of wife
Household non-labor income
Number of children aged<6
Number of household members
Dummy for Black
Inverse Mill's ratio
Observations

1990

Wives

Husbands

Wives

(1)
-59.47
(102.25)

(2)
-31.77
(92.61)

(3)
169.41
(118.95)

-100.70
(31.38)
-263.44
(71.65)
694.59
(375.90)
738.83
(463.87)
-17.43
(13.64)
11.83
(8.77)
-99.52
(38.09)
36.10
(31.73)
-1.44
(0.59)
-149.48
(16.43)
-106.95
(8.70)
244.52
(102.66)
23.33
(12.08)
9235

***
***
*

***

***
***
***
**

40.27
(22.18)
96.74
(50.88)
313.17
(336.22)
126.76
(197.89)
5.11
(6.33)
5.65
(5.45)
9.34
(19.64)
-39.10
(24.03)
0.02
(0.58)
3.12
(10.99)
20.84
(5.26)
-133.97
(68.06)
12.91
(13.05)
9235

*

-102.59
(42.72)
-175.17
(73.23)
1617.47
(945.66)
387.23
(371.11)
-4.31
(4.1)
4.47
(6.73)
-46.86
(28.08)
-130.71
(98.00)
-3.59
(0.82)
-170.84
(20.27)
-121.54
(9.8)
356.63
(62.4)
60.45
(14.21)
11894

**

*

***
**

1980
Husbands
(4)
-78.48
(85.21)

**
**
*

*

***
***
***
***

56.38
(29.67)
131.48
(53.28)
-223.51
(685.21)
1346.66
(339.68)
15.54
(5.31)
-5.05
(4.59)
-217.06
(57.63)
-8.42
(69.94)
-3.10
(0.77)
5.29
(9.75)
1.9
(5.33)
-19.91
(53.27)
-0.12
(9.47)
11894

*
***

***
***

***

***

Wives

Husbands

(5)
336.75
(229.46)

(6)
-187.09
(176.25)

-192.50
(108.84)
-363.75
(188.52)
311.13
(1211.88)
2147.05
(817.68)
-1.14
(5.05)
-7.62
(7.85)
-155.44
(56.22)
56.91
(118.27)
-1.90
(1.9)
-270.4
(24.27)
-100.02
(12.33)
428.53
(69.18)
85.79
(17.80)
4597

*
**

***

***

***
***
***

118.33
(69.88)
183.50
(114.04)
385.57
(875.13)
-1328.39
(514.13)
3.91
(2.09)
-0.66
(5.70)
113.57
(35.62)
-45.91
(84.24)
-4.10
(1.7)
27.95
(12.30)
13.21
(3.80)
-213.41
(66.56)
101.49
(18.59)
4597

Data from the the CPS March supplement and U.S. Census years 2000, 1990 and 1980.
* significant at 10 %; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1 %. Estimated coefficients, and standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by metropolitan area.
All tables report regressions with the same set of covariates described in Section 3. Regressions are corrected for sample selection with Heckman MLE.
Parameters for household non labor income are multiplied by 1,000.
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*
*

***
*

***

***
**

***

Table 3. Effect of Education Ratio on Annual Hours Worked of Couples and Singles
2000
Wives
(1)
Education Ratio

-59.47
(102.25)

1990
Husbands
(2)

Wives
(3)

-31.77
(92.61)

169.41
(118.95)

1980
Husbands
(4)

Wives
(5)

-78.48
(85.21)

336.75
(229.46)

Husbands
(6)
-187.09
(176.25)

Edu Ratio*dy SC

-100.70 ***
(31.38)

40.27 *
(22.18)

-102.59 **
(42.72)

56.38 *
(29.67)

-192.50 *
(108.84)

118.33
(69.88)

Edu Ratio*dy CC

-263.44 ***
(71.65)

96.74 **
(50.88)

-175.17 **
(73.23)

131.48 ***
(53.28)

-363.75 **
(188.52)

183.50
(114.04)

9235

9235

11894

Number of observations

11894

4597

4597

Single Men
(8)

Single Women
(9)

Single Men
(10)

Single Women
(11)

Education Ratio

-93.49
(312.81)

793.40
( 678.12)

49.40
(256.50)

364.53
(590.63)

-130.14
(473.75)

-1005.82
(865.94)

Edu Ratio*dy SC

-95.46
(149.94)

-343.37
(439.32)

-61.76
(184.88)

-212.91
(229.04)

65.98
(200.60)

1.90
(385.56)

Edu Ratio*dy CC

32.02
(225.08)

-535.88
(613.58)

214.63
(297.43)

-264.91
(408.08)

208.15
(325.33)

417.66
(522.43)

696

153

562

185

548

107
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Single Women
(7)

Number of observations

Data from the the CPS March supplement and U.S. Census years 2000, 1990 and 1980.
* ; **; *** significant at 10 %, 5 % and 1 %. Estimated coefficients, standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by metropolitan area.
All tables report regressions with the same covariates described in Section 3. Regressions are corrected for sample selection with Heckman MLE.
Singles defined as "never married". In 1980 non-separated unmarried individuals were included due to scarcity of observations.
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Single Men
(12)

We suggest that for CC women the availability of suitable mates was really restricted
to the highly educated pool, given that it was uncommon for CC women to marry down.
Thus, variations in the CC sex ratio had a larger bargaining power effect back in the 1980
than in recent years, when marrying down became more socially acceptable for women
(Chiappori et al. 2007). Also, wives’ attachment to market work has increased since 1980,
especially for highly educated women (Pencavel 1998). It may be that in 1980s wives’ labor
supply was more responsive to sex ratio changes because their work attachment was weaker.
Finally, divorce rates were at a record high around 1980, so that the higher likelihood of
divorce would make couples more responsive to outside marriage market opportunities. The
findings from 1980, though, have to be interpreted with caution. The very small number of
metropolitan areas (44) identified in that year in CPS and their consequently modest crosssectional variation in sex ratios are likely to make our 1980 sample not representative. As
such, in our following analysis we will focus on the decades of 1990 and 2000.
As to the size of our sex ratio effects, the changes for 2000 correspond to a 5.7
(15.06) percent reduction of the average annual hours worked by “some college” (“collegecollege plus”) married women and to a 1.7 (4.1) percent increase for their corresponding
husbands’. Similarly, in 1990 the education ratio effects amount to a 6.2 (10.69) percent
reduction of the average annual hours worked by “some college” (“college-college plus”)
married women18 and to a 2.53 (5.9) percent increase of their husbands’. These effects are
sizable, given the acknowledged rigidities in the husbands’ labor supply (e.g. Donni, 2005)
and the frequency of the reported labor supply peaking around 40 hours of work per week.
In particular, the impact on husbands is remarkable since traditional analyses do not
emphasize their response to the sex ratio, let alone their labor supply increasing with it. The
Probit regressions of female labor market participation using our education ratios show a negative effect
(although not always significant), in accord with the literature.

18
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direction of those effects is also the same as in the labor supply impact of the quantity sex
ratio found by Chiappori et al. (2002).19
As to the other covariates in the spouses’ labor supply equations, most parameter
estimates are comparable to the literature. In particular, the wives’ own wage response is
always positive significant, while the husbands’ own wage coefficient is negative only in 1980
and the effects are sizable (Table 2). Also the husband’s negative estimate is in accord with
previous empirical findings in the family labor supply literature. In fact, Chiappori et al.
(2002) run similar spouses’ labor supply equations and show negative own wage estimates
for husbands. Furthermore, we find a positive significant cross-wage effect of husbands’
wages on wives’ labor supply, as documented in Chiappori et al. (2002) and Blundell et al.
(2002).
The signal conveyed by the education sex ratio about the quality of outside marriage
market opportunities is increasingly more relevant for highly educated wives and husbands,
due to the fact that education is positively related to important mate attributes such as
wealth, income and success in life. In other words, the availability of valuable mates in the
marriage market represents a more desirable outside opportunity, and a more credible threat,
for spouses that are per se high-quality mates than for the ones in the lower education
brackets. This is in line with the prediction by Iyigun and Walsh (2007), according to which
imbalances in the sex ratios become more relevant for intra-household allocations as the
rank of couples in the assortative order rises, measured here by educational attainment.
Moreover, our results also match evidence in the literature of stronger educational
homogamy for highly educated men and women (Qian 1998). The probability of having a

We also estimate the impact of our quality sex ratio on a sub-sample of couples that actually sort in marriage
by education bracket, i.e. on couples where wives’ education belongs to the same education bracket as their
husbands’. We find a similar pattern of results as in our main specification.

19
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spouse with the same educational background is four times higher than the possibility of
marrying to someone who does not (Mare and Schwartz, 2005).
The bargaining power effect is also estimated on unmarried individuals, separately
for men and women. The results are detailed in columns 7 through 12 of Table 3. Their
labor supply regressions show no significant impact of the education sex ratio in any decade,
as theory predicts. Both men and women exhibit economically negligible and statistically
insignificant coefficients of the sex ratio by education brackets and of its interactions. No
additional impact is found for “some college” and “college-college plus”. Furthermore, all
their coefficients are different from the couples’ sample, which emphasizes the bargaining
power effect on husbands and wives. Only the coefficient reflecting the impact on highschool graduates has a large magnitude for single men. However, the coefficients are never
significant and the single men’s very small sample size, especially in 1980, may explain the
imprecise estimate. This lack of impact on singles is also consistent with the findings of
Chiappori et al. (2002).
Our empirical results emphasize that both the local dimension of spouse availability
and the economic attractiveness of mates affect spouses’ bargaining power and labor supply.
This evidence represents the first empirical support for the bargaining power effect of a
quality sex ratio by education and for its stronger impact at higher levels of educational
attainment. Further evidence presented below, together with the discussion of various
alternative explanations, should help making this claim convincing.

4.2 Impact on older couples
The bargaining power effect of our sex ratio by education is also estimated on subsamples of older couples, using the same specification as above. We report the results in
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Table 4. Couples in their mid-thirties and above exhibit a stronger impact of the education
sex ratios than the entire sample, especially for the “college-college plus” category. With a 10
percentage point increase in the education ratio, the associated decline in wives’ labor supply
is 34.2 annual hours for CC in 2000 and 23.6 annual hours in 1990 (columns 1 and 3), while
for husbands the increase is of 15.7 and 15.9 annual hours, respectively (columns 2 and 4).
The impact for SC is about – 10 hours for wives and 7 for husbands in both decades as seen
in columns 2 and 4. The role of high-school graduates’ sex ratio is still negligible. We believe
that these results reflect different informational values about the quality of potential mates
that educational attainment conveys at different stages of life. At older ages education is a
better predictor of mate quality and economic prosperity because enough time elapsed to
establish social status and wealth. Especially if one has a high educational attainment, the
signal given by the education sex ratio is very quality-informative, so that the effect of such
outside marriage market opportunities on bargaining power is very strong. Education
matters more in marriage choices when prosperity is directly at stake: this is the case for
“older” couples looking at their marriage prospects, since the returns to education are
already realized. Evidence from the literature actually suggests that later age at union
promotes stronger educational homogamy. In particular, men and women aged thirty or
above are less likely to be with partners with a different level of educational attainment than
are persons in their twenties (Qian, 1998).

4.3 Race
Running our main labor supply specification on the sub-sample of white couples
yields the same results as the full sample regressions (Table 5). The education sex ratio20 has
20

For the white sub-sample, EdR is computed using data only for white men and women.
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a negative effect on wives’ labor supply and positive effects on husbands’, with a significantly
stronger impact for the “college-college plus” than for “some college”. The coefficient of
high-school graduates is not significant. As reported in columns 1 and 2, in 2000 with a 10
percentage point increase in the education ratio, “some college” wives experience a
reduction in their annual hours of 8.3 (P value = 0.02) while their spouses increase theirs by
3.8 (P value = 0.1). Moreover, wives in the highest education category reduce their annual
hours worked by 25.6 hours (P value = 0.001), and their spouses experience an increase of
12 annual hours (P value = 0.03). Because of the very small black population present in the
CPS we could not estimate meaningful regressions for only black couples. However,
comparing the findings for white couples to those for the entire sample, it seems that blacks
and whites respond to bargaining power effects of the education sex ratio in a similar
manner. In any case, in our full sample we run a similar regression to check whether the
bargaining power effect of our within-race quality sex ratio varies across races. Each of the
three variables concerning the education sex ratio is interacted with a dummy variable for
race, in order to capture a possible differential effect. No evidence of a different impact
across races was detected.
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Table 4. Effect of Education Ratio on Annual Hours Worked of Older Couples

2000
Wives
(1)

1990
Husbands
(2)

Husbands
(4)

Education Ratio

59.05
(97.94)

Edu Ratio*dy SC

-98.23 ***
(38.70)

71.10 ***
(28.87)

-126.15 **
(62.33)

66.30 *
(38.25)

Edu Ratio*dy CC

-341.92 ***
(95.23)

157.02 **
(57.78)

-236.28 **
(101.01)

159.10 **
(69.09)

6166

6166

6501

6501

Number of observations

-6.96
(103.62)

Wives
(3)
278.6
(182.10)
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Data from the the CPS March supplement and U.S. Census years 2000 and 1990.
* ; ** ; *** significant at 10 %, 5% and 1 %. Estimated coefficients, standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered by metro area.
Regressions with the same covariates described in Section 3. Regressions corrected for sample selection with Heckman MLE.
Old couples are those with wives aged 34 to 65 and husbands aged 38 to 65.
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-160.57
(117.94)

Table 5. Effect of Education Ratio on Annual Hours Worked of White Couples
2000

Edu Ratio

Edu Ratio*dy SC

Edu Ratio*dy CC

51

Number of observations

1990

Wives

Husbands

Wives

Husbands

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

119.31

-109.29

15.45

-141.51

(183.82)

(133.66)

( 157.73)

(100.67)

-83.45

**

38.27

(37.81)

(24.11)

-256.03 ***

120.78

(78.19)
8546

*

-83.24

**

(42.96)

(32.65)

-139.40 *

136.38

(57.51)

(75.83)

(58.27)

8546

11167

11167

**

Data from the the CPS March supplement and U.S. Census years 2000 and 1990.
* ; ** ; *** significant at 10 %, 5% and 1 %. Estimated coefficients, standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered by metro area.
Regressions with the same covariates described in Section 3. Regressions corrected for sample selection with Heckman MLE.
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53.75

**

4.4 High-school graduates
Bargaining power in high-school graduate households does not seem to be affected
by the relative number of men and women that are high-school graduates in a metropolitan
area. We suggest that the lack of an effect at this relatively low level of education could be
due to individuals not deriving significant marital gains in terms of their educational
attainment, so that they are not affected by the mate quality dimension “education”. Another
force driving this result could be that high school graduates, the black ones in particular,
have a lower remarriage rate than higher educated individuals (Smock, 1990). If chances of
remarriage are low, high school graduate couples may not respond to variations in
remarriage market opportunities such as fluctuations in the sex ratio. Moreover, high school
graduate couples exhibit more rigid labor supplies than higher educated spouses. Wives
especially work more hours and are less flexible in specializing in non-market activities than
college graduates (Pencavel, 1998). Low educated couples are likely to hold jobs with fixed
amount of hours to supply and they may not be able to respond to bargaining power shifts
in terms of labor supply.
We also consider the hypothesis that these individuals do not exhibit strong
assortative mating behavior by education because the bracket is too narrow and they may
also look for mates “above”, in the “some college” pool. We thus construct a modified
quality sex ratio, in which couples with a high-school graduate wife are associated with the
sex ratio of high-school graduates plus “some college” men and women. There is no
evidence to support the hypothesis. The bargaining power effect for them is not significant
for husband or wife, while for “some college” and “college-college plus” couples it remains
significant, and with an increasing impact across educational brackets.
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5. Alternative explanations
5.1 Sex ratios as proxy of local labor market opportunities
It may be possible that the labor supply of married women falls not as a result of the
bargaining power effect of mate availability by education brackets, but due to poor local
economic opportunities for women. High values of our quality sex ratio by metropolitan
area may suggest male workers outnumbering female workers because of a local labor
market with gloomy perspectives for women. Similarly, it could be that more educated
women, whose labor supply is high, live in metropolitan areas where there are better job
opportunities for them, so that the negative coefficient of our education ratio represents
labor market instead of bargaining power fluctuations. There are at least three reasons to
believe that the local economy hypothesis does not provide a plausible alternative
explanation for our findings. First, our labor supply regressions include individuals’ wages
and experience, state unemployment rate, total and female labor force participation rate,
which account for the effects of variation in labor market opportunities, specifically for
women. Second, it is difficult to understand why the labor supply of men married to these
women, but not other men, should be higher in those metropolitan areas if it were just a
labor market fluctuation. Third, single women with similar demographic and labor market
characteristics did not experience the same impact of the sex ratios as married women.

5.2 Sex ratio including married and same-sex partners
It may seem that our education sex ratio does not capture the actual availability of
mates in a local marriage market because both married individuals and same-sex partners are
included in the computation of our variable. Its lack of significance in our unmarried
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samples may be attributed to large percentages of unmarried men or women having samesex partners. We believe that our ratio of the total number of men and women present in a
metropolitan area does represent a reliable sex-ratio for three main reasons. First, there is
considerable evidence in the literature that relatively little benefit is realized from
refinements such as computing sex ratios separately by marital status (Fossett and Kiecolt,
1991; Freiden, 1974). Second, we control for the prevalence of same-sex unmarried
households in 2000 and 1990, the only two decades when the Census provides this
information, constructing two ratios: the number of homosexual relationships out of the
total number of households and the number of lesbian relationships out of the total number
of households. These metropolitan level controls ensure that our education sex ratio is an
index of the tightness of the heterosexual marriage markets. Finally, to the extent that the
sizes of the male and female homosexual populations vary together, their impact on the
validity of the sex ratio would be reduced (Fosset and Kiecolt, 1991).

5.3 Marital gains from specialization
It is known that if the education of the husband is higher than the wife’s, there are
gains from the wife specializing in household production and thus working less in the labor
market (Becker 1991; Chiappori et al., 2006). Our quality sex ratio may capture the presence
of these gains, showing that when the education gap of married couples increases (i.e. the
number of highly educated men increases) married women’s labor supply decreases and their
husbands’ increases. However, this link cannot represent an alternative explanation to our
bargaining power interpretation for three reasons. First, our sample consists of already
married couples while the specialization effect should be present only for couples formed
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after any sex ratio change. When we restrict our sample to “older” couples, who are likely to
have gotten married many years prior to the decade under analysis, our bargaining power
interpretation still holds. Second, when we focus on a sub-sample of couples who did indeed
perfectly sort by education brackets, (i.e. no peculiar gain from specialization should be
present for them) our results still hold. Third, we consider positive assortative mating within
education brackets, so that men and women are affected by fluctuations in the sex ratio only
in their own education group. In this case, the education gap of potential spouses and the
corresponding gains from specialization are small.

5.4 Welfare programs for women
Welfare programs favorable to women may discourage female labor supply or
increase the bargaining power of married women by enhancing the value of single
motherhood. However, by definition, welfare programs benefit only low-income
households, while our results hold for all levels of income. Additionally, there is no reason
why the pattern of the main welfare benefits such as AFDC (TANF), EITC and mandated
benefits should vary across metropolitan areas to be more favorable to women where
women are relatively scarce.

6. Conclusions
This chapter further explores the role of sex ratios on intra-household bargaining
power and spouses’ labor supplies, by constructing a quality sex ratio by metropolitan area
and education brackets. We test whether this education ratio affects the balance of power of
couples in the corresponding education brackets, within the framework of a collective labor
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supply household model. We also test that the bargaining power effect of our sex ratio is
greater as the assortative mating order by education increases. We use CPS and Census data
for 2000, 1990 and 1980 at the metropolitan level, and find that married women significantly
reduce their supply of market labor, while their husbands increase theirs as the
corresponding education sex ratio becomes more favorable to women. Couples with
“college-college plus” wives exhibit a stronger impact of the quality sex ratio on their
bargaining power than couples with “some college” wives, whose estimated quality sex ratio
coefficient is in turn larger than for high-school graduates. Our bargaining power
interpretation is strengthened by the fact that unmarried men and women do not exhibit any
significant impact of the education ratio on their labor supply. Alternative explanations such
as local labor market opportunities, marital gains from specialization, welfare programs, and
inclusion of married and same-sex partners in the sex ratio, are rejected.
The findings presented here are consistent with theories where favorable sex ratios
increase female bargaining power in the marriage market. Furthermore, our results indicate
that both the local and quality dimensions of sex ratios are relevant to explaining household
behavior. Our evidence represents the first empirical support for the bargaining power effect
of a quality sex ratio by education and for its stronger impact as higher levels of educational
attainment are considered.
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CHAPTER THREE
CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation studies the impact of changes in outside marriage market
opportunities on intra-household bargaining power. In the first chapter I specify a marriage
market matching model to analyze the impact of the availability of healthy mates on intrahousehold bargaining power. The main prediction of the model is that in marriage markets
in which both healthy and frail men marry, an increase in the relative scarcity of healthy
women enhances wives' bargaining power. This effect is estimated in a collective labor
supply framework in which spousal bargaining power and labor supply are inversely related.
I use CPS data and Census data on disability and construct a sex ratio type measure of mate
availability at the metropolitan level. I estimate labor supplies for white married couples and
find that a higher relative scarcity of healthy women in the couple's metropolitan area
reduces wives' labor supply and increases their husbands'. The role of sex ratios on spouses'
bargaining power is further explored in the second chapter. Using Census and CPS data for
U.S. metropolitan areas in years 2000, 1990 and 1980, we construct a quality sex ratio by
education brackets. We argue that a relative shortage of suitably educated women in the
spouse's potential marriage market increases wives' bargaining power and it lowers their
husbands'. We further check the prediction that this effect is greater as the assortative mating
order by education increases. We find that higher relative shortage of comparably educated
women in the couple's metropolitan area reduces wives' labor supply and increases their
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husbands'. The impact is stronger for couples in higher education groups. Consistent with
bargaining theory, no such effects are found for unmarried individuals.
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